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In a recent article in this journal Quentin Smith has argued that the two 
extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time (the "token-reflexive 
version" and the "date-version") are open to insurmountable difficulties 
and so must be either radically reworked or abandoned in favor of the 
tensed theory. 1 The purpose of this paper is tO defend the new tenseless 
theory against Smith's objections, i shall argue that Smith's central argu- 
ments raise irrelevant objections because they rest upon assumptions 
that are accepted by the old tenseless theory of time, but are rejected 
by the new tenseless theory. 
Recent defenders of the tenseless view have come to embrace the 
thesis that tensed sentences cannot be translated by tenseless ones 
without loss of meaning. Nevertheless, they have denied that the 
ineliminability of tensed language and thought entails the reality of 
temporal properties. According to the new tenseless theory of time, 
tensed discourse is indeed necessary for timely action, but tensed facts 
are not Since the truth conditions of tensed sentences can be expressed 
in a tenseless metalanguage that describes unchanging temporal rela- 
tions between and among events. 
On the token-reflexive version of the new tenseless theory the 
temporal relation between a tensed sentence token and the event or 
date that such a judgment is about provides an objective basis for the 
truth value of any tensed sentence. For example, any token S of "It is 
now 1980" is true if an only if S occurs in 1980; any token R of "It was 
1980" is true if and only if R is later than 1980, and so on. Thus, on 
the token-reflexive account the truth conditions of tensed sentence and 
judgment tokens are tenseless facts. 
Smith begins his argument against the token-reflexive account of the 
truth conditions of tensed sentences by noting that 
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(1) It is now 1980 
entails the sentence 
(2) 1980 is present. 
In the language of facts this means that there cannot be a fact statable by any token S of 
(1) unless there is a fact statable by any token V of (2). In other words, a fact statable 
by S implies a fact statable by V, and consequently a fact statable by V is among the 
truth conditions of S. (p. 379) 
As this passage makes apparent, Smith assumes that a logical entail- 
ment among sentences in ordinary language must be represented by a 
"logical entailment" among the facts that make those sentences true. 
That is, he assumes that since (1) entails (2), the truth conditions of (1) 
must entail the truth conditions of (2). He then argues that since the 
tenseless truth conditions (or the fact statable by any token S) of (1), 
namely, S occurs in 1980, does not entail the tenseless truth conditions 
(or the fact statable by any token V) Of (2) namely, V occurs in 1980, 
he concludes that in addition to tenseless truth conditions, (1) and (2) 
must also have tensed truth 'conditions. As Smith puts it, the token- 
reflexive version of the new tenseless theory fails to establish that 
tenseless facts are the only truth conditions of tensed sentence-tokens; tensed facts 
need to be assumed to account for the entailment-relations between tensed sentences. 
9  [Token-reflexive] tenseless truth conditions could not explain the logical equivalence 
of "It is now 1980" and "1980 is present", since S occurs in 1980 neither implies nor is 
implied by V occurs in 1980. (p. 384) 
We may agree that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical 
equivalence of (1) and (2), but that constitutes an objection to the 
tenseless view only if we presuppose a conception of analysis that is 
shared by proponents of the old tenseless theory of time, but is rejected 
by proponents of the new theory. 2 
To begin to see what is involved in this last point note that the early 
defenders of the tenseless view believed that a complete description or 
analysis of time could be symbolically represented in a non-indexical 
tenseless language. To give a complete description or analysis involves 
constructing a single language that performs two functions. First, in its 
"logical" function, this perspicuous or ideal language (IL) is a symbolic 
device for representing or transcribing the logic of sentences contained 
in ordinary language. For example, in ordinary language arguments are 
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given that involve the entailment of one sentence by another, and in its 
logical function the IL represents the correct logical form that all 
sentences and all entailments in a natural language can take. The 
second function of the IL, call it the "ontological" function, is to 
provide a representation of the kinds of entities that there are as well as 
the facts that exist. One might conceive of the IL in its ontological 
function as containing expressions that are neither true nor false, but 
are ontological explanations for (some) true sentences in ordinary 
language, or "stand-ins, for the facts represented by them. By assuming 
that both these functions could be performed by a single IL the old 
tenseless theory drew ontological conclusions from logical considera- 
tions. Specifically, they argued that since the logic of ordinary temporal 
discourse could be represented in a tenseless language, the ontological 
nature of time consisted of unchanging temporal relations between 
terms that did not have tensed properties. 
Given the assumptions concerning analysis implicit in the old tense- 
less theory, Smith's argument against the token-reflexive account is very 
strong. For  in order to perform its logical function the analysis of 
tensed discourse must be able to explain the inference from (1) "It is 
now 1980" to (2) "1980 is present." However, in order to perform its 
ontological function the analysis of tensed discourse must represent 
those sentences as tenselessly expressing temporal relations between a 
sentence token and the time at which it occurs. The problem, then, is 
that the ontological description expressible in a tenseless language 
cannot explain the logical entailment of (2) by (1). Thus, on the tense- 
less view, the logical representation of tensed discourse is inadequate, 
and given that the logical and ontological representations are to be 
performed by a single language, it follows that the ontological repre- 
sentation is also inadequate and that, therefore, there must be temporal 
properties and tensed facts. 
Thus, Smith does indeed have a point. He has shown that the token- 
reflexive account of tense cannot be a complete description or analysis 
of time insofar as it purports to represent, within a single language, both 
the logical form of ordinary temporal discourse and the metaphysical 
nature of time. But that is not an argument against the new tenseiess 
theory of time because in rejecting the criterion of translatability as a 
method for determining the metaphysical nature of time proponents of 
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the new tenseless theory are, or should be, rejecting the conception of 
analysis upon which Smith's argument rests. 
The new tenseless theory accepts the tenser's claim that tensed 
discourse and thought are fneliminable. It therefore agrees that any 
logically adequate representation of temporal language, that is, any 
language capable o f  representing the meaning and logical implications 
of our ordinary talk about time, must be tensed. The detenser denies, 
however, that from an ontological point of view, a perspective that 
attempts to represent the nature of time, that tense is ineliminable. 
Smith understands very well that recent detensers maintain that tense- 
less sentences cannot be replaced by tenseless ones without loss of 
meaning. What he fails to appreciate is that in accepting the irreducible 
nature of tensed discourse, the new tenseless theory is abandoning the 
analytic ideal of arriving at a single language that is adequate for both 
ontological and logical investigations. Once these two functions of 
language are separated and kept distinct, it is open to the defender of 
the tenseless view to maintain that logical connections among sentences 
in ordinary language do not represent ontological connections between 
facts in the world. Thus, though (1) and (2) mean the same thing and 
entail each other, it does not follow that there must be a necessary 
connection between the facts that provide the basis for their truth. Nor 
does it follow that tensed facts must be introduced to explain their 
logical equivalence. According to the new token-reflexive account of 
time not only can two sentences, such as "It is now 1980" and "S 
occurs in 1980," with different meanings correspond to the same fact, 
but two sentences, such as (1) and (2), with the same meaning can 
correspond to different facts. These are the consequences of rejecting 
the conception of analysis upon which Smith's criticism is based. By 
failing to acknowledge them Smith's argument, while applicable to the 
old token-reflexive version of the tenseless theory, is inapplicable to the 
new theory. 
Smith's main argument against the "date-version" of the new tense- 
less theory of time also raises an irrelevant objection and for the same 
reason. On the date-analysis temporal indexicals like "now," "this time" 
and "the present," as used on a given occasion, and proper names such 
as dates, are referring terms which rigidly designate a time. Thus, the 
truth conditions of the tensed sentence, "It is now 1980" uttered in 
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1980, are expressible by the use of the necessary truth "1980 is at 
1980" uttered at any time. And this is just the point. The metaphysical 
implications of tensed discourse are nil. An event or time being now is 
nothing more  than its occurring at the time at which it occurs. 
Smith attempts to avoid that conclusion by arguing that a 1980 
token of "It is now 1980" is logically contingent and for that reason 
must impart the tensed information that 1980 has the property of 
presentness. He  begins his argument by claiming that "the date '1980'  in 
its normal use expresses the sense that is also expressible by an 
attributive u se  of the definite description ' the 12-month period that is 
1979 years later than the birth of Christ '"  (p. 387). He  then argues that 
a 1980 token of "now" refers to the set of all and only those events that, in fact, 
possesses the property of being the 12-month period that is 1979 years later than the 
birth of Christ. If we call this set "A", we can say that the 1980 token of "It is now 
1980" directly refers to A and asserts the identity of A with the 12-month period that 
9 is 1979 years later than the birth of Christ. But this identity is contingent! For there are 
possible worlds in which A is not the 12-month period that is 1979 years later than the 
birth of Christ. (p. 387) 
Smith's reasoning is valid, but his conclusion, that "the 1980 token of 'It 
is now 1980' is only contingently true" constitutes an objection to the 
new tenseless theory only if he confounds the two functions of language 
that the new theory insists must be distinguished. 
To see why this is so consider that in ordinary language the date- 
expression "1980" has the same meaning as "the 12-month period that 
is 1979 years later than the birth of Christ." Thus, if the representation 
of "It is now 1980" is to preserve its informational content and capture 
its meaning, then we cannot transcribe it as the necessary truth "1980 is 
at 1980." In other words, in a logically adequate language - -  a language 
that represents the meanings and entailments of sentences in a natural 
language - -  "1980" cannot be a rigid designator of  the time referred to 
by a 1980 use of "now" since if it was, then the transcription would 
not convey the information that we ordinarily associate with a tensed 
sentence like "It is now 1980." On the other hand,  in an ontologicaily 
adequate language - -  a language used to represent the metaphysical 
nature of time - -  "1980" cannot be replaced by the description that 
captures its meaning since if it was  then the transcription would no 
longer be a perspicuous representation of the tenseless theory of time. 
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If, however, we keep the logical and ontological functions of language 
distinct, then detensers can agree that in a language constructed to 
represent the logical form of sentences in ordinary language, "It is now 
1980" is contingent, while also maintaining that in a language con- 
structed to represent the metaphysical nature of time it is a trivial truth 
perspicuously represented as "1980 is at 1980." 
Smith's central arguments against both versions of the new tenseless 
theory of time result from a fusing of logical and ontological considera- 
tions. He thereby presupposes a methodological framework or concep- 
tion of analysis that is shared proponents of the old tenseless theory, 
but rejected by defenders of the new tenseless theory. Although Smith 
is not alone in assuming this framework I believe that recent detensers 
are correct in abandoning it. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to give a general argument in support of that point I shall conclude with 
the more modest claim to have defended the new tenseless theory of 
time against Smith's central objections. 
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